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Abstract 
Based on interviews with facility managers in the electroplating and chemical industries, this 
study examines regulated firms’ perceptions of how various instrumental, normative and 
social factors motivated their firms' safety, health and environmental actions. We found that 
‘implicit general deterrence’ (the overall effect of sustained inspection and enforcement 
activity) was far more important than either specific or general deterrence, and that 
deterrence in any form was of far greater concern to small and medium sized enterprises than 
it was to large ones. Most reputation-sensitive firms in the chemical industry chose to go 
substantially beyond compliance for reasons that related to risk management and to the 
perceived need to protect their social license to operate. Almost half our respondents also 
provided normative explanations for why they complied. Overall, we conclude that there are 
various, often interwoven strands that must be taken into account in understanding what 
motivates corporate safety, health and environmental behavior, and how they play out 
depends very much on the size and sophistication of companies themselves and on the 
characteristics of the industry sector within which they are located. 
 
This paper is part of a broader project funded by the US EPA’s Science to Achieve Results 
(STAR) program, managed by the EPA’s office of Research and Development, National 
Center for Environmental Research. STAR research supports the agency’s mission to 
safeguard human health and the environment. 
 
 4
 
I. Introduction 
 
Most regulatory policymakers and officials, at least in the United States, believe that strong 
legal punishment of serious and willful violations serves a vital "general deterrence" 
function.1 Underlying this view is the assumption that regulated business corporations take 
costly measures to meet public policy goals only when (1) specifically required to do so by 
law, and (2) they believe that legal non-compliance is likely to be detected and harshly 
penalised.2 From the viewpoint of traditional models of business firms as “amoral 
calculators,”3 why would a profit-maximising company want to do what the law requires in 
the absence of credible regulatory enforcement, since meeting public policy goals is often 
expensive and usually does not in any obvious way provide the company with any 
marketplace advantage? 
 
Yet research in various areas of social regulation indicates that the link between deterrence 
and compliance is complex. Regulated business firms’ perceptions of legal risk play a far 
more important role in shaping firm behavior than the objective likelihood of legal sanctions 
(Simpson 1990:Ch2). More significantly, deterrence in either form may be far less important 
than many regulators assume.4 In one of the best studies, Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) 
found that in the case of nursing home regulation, there was virtually no correlation between 
facilities' regulatory compliance rates and their perceptions of the certainty and severity of 
punishment for violations, except for certain minorities of actors in some contexts 
(Braithwaite & Makkai 1991:35). 
 
This and other research suggests that in addition to the threat of legal punishment, regulated 
enterprises' motivations to comply with regulatory requirements stem from a wide variety of 
other factors, including a general belief in the legitimacy of regulatory requirements (Tyler 
1990), perceived social costs, shame or guilt (Grasmick & Bursik 1990), informal sanctions 
inflicted by local communities, NGOs and others (Gunningham et al. 2003), and so on.5 
These findings raise a series of questions: 
(1) In stimulating compliance by particular regulated businesses, how salient and 
important are the “general deterrence” messages sent by formal legal sanctions 
against other firms, compared to 
(a) the “specific deterrence” engendered by inspections of and legal sanctions of the 
firm itself, and 
(b) the “implicit deterrence” message sent simply by the dissemination of 
governmental regulations, 
(c) the threat of informal economic and social sanctions, or 
(d) normative commitments to compliance with laws and regulations? 
 
(2) Do motivations vary across firms - depending for example, on the type and size of 
organisation (Gray & Scholz 1991:185-214), or the characteristics of particular 
industry sectors? 
 
One perspective on these questions is provided by a related article (Thornton et al. (2005)), in 
which we report the results of our survey of 233 firms in 8 industries, focusing on 
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environmental protection. The survey findings suggested that most respondents did not 
follow closely and remember news of legal sanctions against other firms in their industry, 
carefully calculating their responses accordingly. There was little evidence for the direct 
response to such knowledge predicted by what we labeled “explicit general deterrence” 
theory. Yet there was some support for what we labeled “implicit general deterrence” – the 
sense that the mere existence of official laws and regulations entail both some risk of 
punishment and a duty to comply. Thus almost all respondents could remember some salient 
legal actions against some firms at some time in the past. And a majority reported that 
hearing about legal sanctions against other firms had prompted them to review, and often to 
take further action to strengthen, their own firm's preventative program.  For most 
respondents, hearing about sanctions against other firms had primarily a “reminder” and 
“reassurance” function – reminding them to review their own compliance status and 
reassuring them that if they invested in compliance efforts, their competitors who  cheated 
would probably not get away with it. 
 
This working paper reports on a second phase of the same research project. It entailed longer, 
more in-depth interviews with industrial facility managers in the electroplating and chemical 
industry -- two of the 8 industries that were the focus of the 233-firm survey. By means of 
the in-depth, more discursive and qualitative interviews, we sought to delve more deeply into 
regulated firms’ perceptions of the role of general deterrence, specific deterrence and other 
factors in motivating their firms' environmental, and to a lesser extent, occupational health or 
safety related actions. And these qualitative interviews also enabled us to pay closer attention 
to the role of firm size and industrial context in shaping managers' motivations in dealing 
with safety, health and environmental problems. The basic theory of general deterrence and 
its alternatives are discussed in a literature review in Thornton et al. (2005) and are omitted 
here for the sake of brevity. 
 
It should be noted that in the chemical and electroplating industries, safety, health and 
environmental considerations are closely connected. For the chemical industry, what 
threatens workers’ health (eg toxic substances) or safety (eg explosions) inside the plant is 
likely to be of similar concern (perceived in environmental terms) to communities and others 
outside. And for electroplaters, the toxic substances that, if improperly disposed of, may 
cause serious environmental harm, similarly threaten the health of their workers if 
improperly used. The chemical industry in particular, now tends to regard safety, health and 
environmental considerations as inextricably intertwined, as evidenced by its adoption of 
common safety, health and environmental management systems, and the creation of senior 
management positions with responsibilities which combine these functions. Having said this, 
some of our questions (eg with regard to the role of local communities) were concerned 
exclusively with environment protection, and others took environmental concerns as their 
main point of departure. However, even in answering such questions, respondents not 
infrequently drew on OHS as well as environmental illustrations. In examining 
environmental as well as OHS considerations, this Working Paper also pursues one of the 
National Research Centre’s current agendas: seeking to draw lessons for OHS regulation 
from empirical research in closely related areas of social regulation. 
 
 
 6
II. Methodology 
 
We undertook a series of in-depth telephone interviews, asking open-ended questions to a 
sample of 34 chemical and electroplating companies in two different states (Washington and 
Ohio).6  These two industries were selected for more intensive study from the eight industries 
that were the focus of our survey research (Thornton et al. (2005)), and were chosen because 
they varied most strikingly by average size and sophistication of firm, from small 
(electroplating) to larger (chemicals). The questions were designed to assess the relative 
salience of (a) general deterrence messages (b) other regulatory pressures (inspections, fear 
of private lawsuits), and (c) community, market-based, and reputation based pressures, in 
shaping the facility's environmental behavior. Our basic strategy here was to ask company 
officials and environmental managers to describe the most important safety, health and 
environmental improvements they had made in recent years and the actions they were most 
proud of, and why they had undertaken them (without prompting as to potential explanatory 
variables). Later in the interview we asked them to rate various factors, as causative 
influences. Finally, interviewees were asked directly and explicitly for their view of the 
effect of deterrence on their company and industry’s behavior. 
 
When coding interviews, the questions were divided into four areas: (a) respondents’ theories 
of how and why the industry had improved (Q1), (b) respondents explanations of why their 
firm had undertaken particular environmental actions(Q2-4), (c) respondents general 
explanation of their safety, health and environmental motivations (Q5-6); and (d) respondents 
responses to prompts about the importance of punishment and deterrence (Q7-9). We also 
draw on data gathered in our 233 firm survey, particularly, statistics relating to Colorado 
electroplaters and Kentucky chemical manufacturing and blending facilities. 
 
Electroplating companies were chosen for examination because the industry has important 
safety, health and environmental impacts, because it has characteristics that inhibit the 
application of conventional regulatory measures (Gunningham & Sinclair 2002) and detract 
from the effectiveness of deterrence, because it has been targeted by regulators as a high 
priority for enforcement action, and because companies in this industry tend to be small or 
very small. Among interviewees, company size ranged from 1 employee to 117 employees, 
with a median size of 32 employees. In part as a result of the small size of most firms, the 
electroplating industry has not been the subject of sustained environmental campaigns by 
activist organisations or community groups, and ‘social license’ pressures (Gunningham et 
al. 2004), have been muted. Thus examining this industry allows us allows us to compare the 
different external drivers of different types of companies and how small (defined as under 30 
employees) and large enterprises differ in terms of their safety, health and environmental 
motivations. 
 
Chemical companies were chosen because this industry also has important safety, health and 
environmental impacts, because it has been subject to substantial regulation for many years 
because it has often been under intense scrutiny from communities and local activist 
organisations, and because it contains both (SMEs) and large corporations, enabling us to 
study both groups within the same industry sector. While company size varies a good deal 
(from 20 to 67,000 employees), only two chemical manufacturing companies in our sample 
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employed fewer than 100 people, and half (7/15) employed more than 1,000 people. For 
present purposes, SMEs are defined as those with less than a thousand employees. Thus all 
electroplaters (the largest of whom had 117 employees) and half the chemical companies 
constituted our population of SMEs. 
 
Beyond this, there are further reasons why these two industry sectors are well suited for 
testing the credibility of deterrence theory. To the extent that there may be niches where 
deterrence has greater explanatory power (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991) then one might 
speculate that these will include business organisations involved in the pursuit of profit 
(Braithwaite & Geis:292); and to small, simple organisations with minimal principal-agent 
problems (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991). The electroplating and chemicals industries both 
involve business organisations rather than individuals, and both involve a substantial number 
of small organisations (but also large ones whose response we can compare). And since 
perceptions apparently matter far more than the objective imposition of sanctions, there is 
special appeal in studying an industry - such as electroplating – where the perception of 
deterrence action is particularly high.7 
 
In terms of the codes used below, E = Electroplater, C = Chemicals, O = Ohio based, W = 
Washington based, s = small electroplater (under 30 employees), l = large electroplater (over 
30 employees), S = Small or Medium Sized chemicals enterprise (under 1000 employees), L 
= large chemicals enterprise (over 1000 employees). The number at the end of the code is the 
identifier of the particular enterprise. 
 
 
III. Change Over Time 
 
Our industry respondents were almost unanimous in asserting that the safety, health and 
environmental performance of their industry had improved very substantially over the last 
10-15 years. Electroplaters could often give graphic descriptions of how their own facilities 
had improved over that period. For example EOl-5 recollected how his workplace “was a 
complete mess 17 years ago…we were accumulating waste under the decks and there was 
two feet of sludge under the floor from drips and spillage. It had to be seen to be believed.” 
And EOs-15 similarly reflected that “In all honesty, this place was a shithole, there were 
plenty of fumes and our workers had to get nasal exams on a regular basis.” They, like 
numerous other respondents, described a substantial shift from a ‘dump and drain’ mentality 
(“if you had to get rid of something you just dumped it” EWl-12) to a more responsible 
approach, involving use of fewer, and less toxic chemicals, increased precautions to 
safeguard workers health, and also reduced water consumption, reuse and recycling, and 
disposal to prescribed facilities.8 
 
In the case of the chemical industry, the defining ‘wake up call’ for many large companies 
was the disaster at the Union Carbide’s Bhopal chemical plant in India, which killed an 
estimated 2-3000 workers and members of the surrounding community in 1984 (Shrivastava 
1992). This had prompted collective action by chemical companies internationally and the 
development of a management system-based, self-regulatory program for curbing safety, 
health and environmental hazards: Responsible Care (Gunningham & Grabosky 1998:Ch 4). 
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However, many respondents also identified a range of much more recent changes in attitudes 
and outcomes, especially in reducing the amount of waste generated and disposed of, and in 
curbing emissions. As CWS-9 put it: “companies have become more knowledgeable about 
the long term impact of their choices and have become more diligent about properly 
disposing of their by-products. Also they have decreased exposures, both to their workers 
and the community.”9 
 
In both sectors, far more complex than determining whether the industry has substantially 
improved its environmental performance over the last decade or so is determining why it has 
done so. The motivational jigsaw that we attempted to piece together from our interview 
data, led us to believe that very different factors were at work in the two sectors and that, 
particularly within the chemical industry, there were further differences between the 
motivators of large corporations and of SMEs. For heuristic purposes, we examine these 
motivators under a number of discrete categories below while exploring the interaction 
among those categories in the subsequent discussion. 
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IV. The Electroplating Industry: Resistance is Futile 
 
The electroplaters in our sample were almost entirely small enterprises. The very large 
majority had less than 100 employees, many less than 50 and some less than five. Only four 
had more than 100 employees and more than a single location. 
 
A. Legal incentives 
All electroplaters unequivocally attributed the markedly improved safety, health and 
environmental performance of the industry to the effects of regulation and/or enforcement. 
Their responses did not clearly untangle the relative importance of regulations’ normative 
message from the threat or actuality of enforcement. Nor was the relative salience of general 
deterrence versus specific deterrence entirely clear. But as we will see, regulation permeated 
respondents’ decision-making process and shaped their options in taken-for-granted ways, 
generating a perception that, as the Borg in Star Trek put it: “resistance is futile.”10 
 
Sanctions. For most electroplaters, the specter of legal sanctions for non-compliance 
was never far from their minds. Ninety percent believed that the threat of fines and jail or 
prison sentences was a powerful motivator of safety, health and environmental action for 
their industry. And almost half, when explaining why they had undertaken an important 
environmental measure, described a fine or prison sentence that had occurred at the company 
(specific deterrence 24%), a fine or prison sentence that had occurred at another company 
(general deterrence 12%), or mentioned that the action had been taken to avoid a fine or 
prison sentence (12%). 
 
For most, sanctions had an obvious and powerful impact. According to EOl-9 “Monetarily, 
companies have been hesitant to install treatment equipment that was required to meet the 
regulations. The financial burden was substantial – “what’s in it for me?” The answer was “if 
you don’t, you get fined or sent to jail” Similarly EWl-5 perceived his employer’s motivation 
as being “Fear basically. He decided to go along with it when he found out the he could get 
fined for not dealing with the situation.” Indeed there was almost a sense of inevitability 
about being penalised for noncompliance – a sense that in the long run, you simply could not 
get away with it. 
EWs-14: I ain’t never been fined but...  It’s pretty easy in a business like this for them to 
detect things in the water. Especially where I’m the only one in this county, you know, that 
has the chemicals that I have. And the trouble with the fines are... Like I said, I never had 
one, but the place I worked at, they had a couple. And they seem to get larger, you know, for 
the same thing. They keep raising it. I think more or less to make you want to do something 
to correct it.... Being a small business, I can’t afford to be fined you know. I make it from one 
month to the next. 
 
The fear of fines in turn was often used to bring about internal changes within the firm. As 
one owner put it to his workforce: “If we get a fine your raise is gone – there’s a direct 
relationship. It’s a good way to make it hit home” (EOl-4). And another made “everyone 
aware we need to do whatever and we make them more cost conscious. If we don’t do it right 
we might get a $10,000 fine…If they know they’re going to be inspected they don’t want to 
pay fines because its money down the drain” (EOl-3). 
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Significantly, the size of these ‘inevitable’ penalties, were seen as sufficient to result in 
facility closure. Sixty percent of electroplaters interviewed felt there were only two choices: 
comply or be closed down, and 35% mentioned at least one specific example of an 
electroplating company that had gone out of business either trying to keep up with the 
regulations, or because of penalties imposed by the regulations. Some referred to stories of 
firms elsewhere who: “have just gone out of business because the regulations have gotten so 
tough down there. I had a guy call me last week that wanted to get a couple of things plated 
and he said there were no plating shops left close to him” (EWs-14). 
 
Similar results to those of our Washington and Ohio interviews were found in our random 
survey (Thornton et al. (2005)) of 17 electroplating facilities in Colorado. 
 
Regulation and implicit deterrence. But for most facilities, it was the direct impact of 
regulations themselves that was the immediate driver of their safety, health and 
environmental behavior, as the following examples make clear: “regulation was the driving 
force and we just implemented it” (EOl-3);  “everything we’ve done we’ve done because of 
regulations coming aboard or those already there so we could meet them easier” (EOs-11); 
And “As the laws changed, we finally changed” (EWl-12). And EWs-14 summarised the 
incremental but seemingly inexorable nature of the regulatory process as follows: 
When I first went to work in this trade I didn’t even know [who the regulators were] and then 
all of a sudden I started hearing a little bit about them, and the next thing I know they start 
coming around the place that I worked. Maybe once a year they’d come along. They didn’t 
come around too often. Then pretty soon they started coming up with regulations, you know. 
You can’t discharge more than this. And, at first if you watched it you could stay within the 
limits pretty easily. But then they lowered the limits. It kept getting tougher and tougher. 
 
When our respondents described the impact of regulations they rarely made an explicit 
reference to the role of sanctions, and portrayed the impact of regulation upon them as a very 
direct one. Yet taken in the context of their references elsewhere to the importance of 
sanctions, as described above, it was clear that there was an implicit recognition that non-
compliance would sooner or later result in penalties. And respondents made taken-for-
granted assumptions about the potentially disastrous effect of punishment in the event of 
breach. We return to what we term “implicit deterrence” in the discussion section. 
 
Proactive safety, health or environmental behavior, not mandated by regulation, was unusual 
amongst electroplaters, but not unknown. We found three instances where an electroplater 
had sought out ways to save money by making safety, health and environmental 
improvements independent of regulation. The other electroplaters reported taking such action 
only when regulation required them to do so. Yet it was common for electroplaters to 
acknowledge that once they had responded to regulatory pressure by making safety, health or 
environmental improvements, there were sometimes considerable gains to be made from 
exploiting the ‘win-win’ opportunities revealed. For example, EWs-14 (a one person 
operation) described how he made savings on chemicals by rinsing over a rinse tank and then 
putting the rinse water back into the process. Asked whether he would have made those 
savings without the regulations, his response was: “Probably not. I wouldn’t have been 
forced into doing what I’m doing, you see.” 
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Inspections. Inspections (and the anticipation of future inspections), had a powerful 
influence on firm behavior, and whatever inspectors required, electroplaters seemingly 
implemented. EWs-2 summed it up as follows: “They [the regulator] came in and said we 
want this, this and this done. And they wanted to see the improvements.” “They [the 
regulators] are making platers do things more ethical. Everything used to go down the 
drain…They made us put in a treatment system. Now we’re careful not to have chemicals 
lying around. We’re careful about drip and run off from tanks, and we make sure there’s no 
spillage. We’ve improved because we are annually inspected” (EOS-1). Similarly for EWs-2: 
“The [regulator] looks through the whole shop for things that are not in place –the dirty filter 
with cyanide residue on it, the chemicals that shouldn’t be next to each other.” 
 
For the most part, these responses suggest that inspections, with their implicit threat of 
specific deterrence, played a prominent role in decision-making by making the need to 
comply appear inevitable. Indeed, our respondents’ comments in the previous section about 
the importance of regulation must be read in the context that once the regulation was in 
place, they believed they would be inspected, infractions would be detected, and powerful 
sanctions imposed. 
 
The legitimacy of regulation. Despite what was uniformly reported as the high costs of 
compliance, most electroplating facilities thought that safety, health and environmental 
regulations were legitimate. In fact, complaints about enforcement action tended to focus on 
the injustice of others not being penalised, or not being penalised harshly enough. For 
example EOs-15 complained about inconsistency, citing the fact that “we got a $10,000 fine 
because we were late in testing new equipment, which we had gotten so as to be in 
compliance, while [another company ] …only got $1,000 fine.” None of our respondents 
criticised the need for regulation and a number actively endorsed it. EWs-7 for example, said 
“There’s been no opposition. Once it’s presented to you that the air is not good for you, it’s 
ludicrous to disagree.” 
 
This was a common sentiment, suggestive of an ethical dimension to decision-making, and 
for some 40% of respondents, there was a clear vein of civic responsibility in the way they 
couched their responses. This group professed to make changes required by regulation 
simply because it was ‘the right thing to do’. For example: 
EOl-3: when I was hired the first statement was ‘we do nothing illegal –if you are harboring 
those thoughts, don’t work here’. They mean it. 
 
Those who offered a civic responsibility explanation for their behavior tended to divide the 
world into two classes of people (good guys and bad guys) and to talk pejoratively about the 
bad guys, who were commonly seen not just as immoral but as ‘stupid’, incompetent or 
irrational. Consistent with this civic responsibility theme, almost half of the electroplaters in 
our sample also expressed support for co-operative regulatory styles in which they were 
given information and technical advice to facilitate compliance and minimise compliance 
costs. As such, they implied that coercion was unnecessary. For example, “some people 
despise regulators. I can’t agree. In our industry they work with me –they give us technical 
options and we decide which we go for…We work hand in hand…Once we know it’s hurting 
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the environment, we’d don’t do it” EWs-7. Indeed, for this respondent, complying with 
regulation, doing the right thing, and following the inspector’s advice, were so closely 
connected that he found it difficult to disentangle their influence. Similarly for EOs-1: “I 
don’t know all the rules. I do what I think is right…There is only so much you can learn. If 
someone comes in I say, “You’ll find things that don’t fit with the rulebook. Work with us to 
get into compliance.” 
 
This ethical concern for safety, health and environmental performance (and in particular a 
belief in the legitimacy of environmental regulation) was not universal. One company in our 
sample expressed the viewpoint that compliance, or the appearance of compliance, was 
simply instrumental. “It’s all about money. Most owners want to play the game to make a 
certain amount and then get out, with no concern for the employees health and safety. 
Consequently, they want to scrimp on everything they can… to stay in the good graces with 
the regulators…to keep ‘em away from us” (EOl-5). 
 
Perhaps understandably, therefore, many of those firms who supported regulation as ‘the 
right thing to do’ wanted harsh punishment for recalcitrant firms that evaded the law or made 
no effort to comply. 
 
General Deterrence. General deterrence is premised on the notion that punishment to one 
person/enterprise will discourage others from engaging in similar proscribed conduct. Most 
electroplaters did not consciously see general deterrence (hearing of other companies being 
sanctioned) as playing a motivational role in their safety, health or environmental behavior. 
In response to our specific prompts, only one facility saw general deterrence, in this narrow 
sense, as a powerful motivator of their environmental actions, while 11/17 saw it as relatively 
unimportant in their decision to take an environmental action. Only 2/17 facilities reported 
that general deterrence had motivated them to take an important environmental action. Eol-5 
described taking environmental action because of “fear-when we found we could get fined – 
someone  at a company where a lot of us used to work was shackled [sent to jail] – which 
scared our owner.” 
 
However, enforcement actions against others focused their attention on safety, health and 
environmental issues. Company respondents described such cases as ‘head turners’ and 
‘keeping you on your toes.’ EOs-10 said, “If we hear of others getting fined, we figure why 
they got in trouble and we try to do it right.” But most facilities told us that although they 
might look, they very seldom made any changes. Several reasons were cited: (i) They often 
heard about deterrence actions second or third-hand through word of mouth and lacked 
sufficiently reliable details to know what action was appropriate. (ii) Differences in the 
nature of the work companies did, or the size of the facilities, made comparisons difficult. 
(iii) Those that were punished were seen as fundamentally unlike our respondents – as ‘bad 
guys’ who flagrantly ignored the law. 
 
Despite their rather muted endorsement of general deterrence, most facilities nevertheless 
believed that without general enforcement and sanctions the safety, health and environmental 
performance of their industry would decay over time and that some fraction of companies 
(the ‘bad guys’ or those who couldn’t afford to comply) would stop complying. However, the 
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vast majority of respondents reported that their own facility’s performance would not decay. 
Most reported that they would continue to operate their treatment systems, although ‘little 
things,’ like completing hazardous materials labels, might not get done, and new 
environmental protection measures might not be initiated, at least where these were 
expensive. As EWS-6 put it: “I like to think we’d be smart enough to be prudent. But when it 
comes to writing the check for $80 or $90,000, you’d look at what some of the other people 
are doing”. 
 
B. Economic motivations 
While all electroplaters attributed improvements in the environmental performance of the 
industry to regulation, enforcement or liability (the legal sphere), 40 percent of larger 
electroplaters (4/10) also attributed improvements to economic incentives, while none of the 
smaller electroplaters did so. For example, for EOl-13: “Why have things improved? For 
compliance reasons and to cut down on the cost of hazardous waste.” 
 
However, when explaining why they had taken particular important environmental actions, 
90% of Ohio facilities and 50% of Washington facilities attributed these actions partly to the 
economic sphere. Larger and smaller companies were equally likely to mention economic 
incentives. These tended to fall in one of two categories: taking action to achieve cost 
savings, and taking action in response to customers’ concerns, although it is important to note 
that the latter focused almost exclusively on environment rather than OHS. 
 
The Limits of Economic Motivations. Despite the economic incentives described above, 
respondents identified a range of other circumstances in which the costs involved in making 
environmental improvements far exceeded any economic benefit. So for EWs-6, “The state 
of technology makes it difficult to get some metals out [of our discharges]- Most shops can’t 
reach the [regulatory] standard because the equipment and chemical stuff we use don’t get us 
there. It would take research or very expensive equipment.” EOl-8 also reported that “the 
biggest obstacle is cost- it’s money all the time – the number one factor which makes us 
decide how well to comply. Our company spent over $1 million upgrading between ’93 and 
’95 to meet new regulations.” Again for EOl-8: “cost is a great concern for a small 
company…It’s highly competitive and not easy to raise prices”. 
 
Moreover, even where safety, health or environmental actions led to cost savings, many 
respondents, particularly from small companies, told us that they would likely not have taken 
action in the absence of regulation.  
 
Other motivators. While all electroplaters described legal motivations as important, and a 
significant proportion also referred to economic incentives, a minority was also influenced by 
other considerations. A third of Ohio electroplaters talked about the impact of their actions 
on the health and safety of employees as at least partially motivating their behavior. For 
example, EOl-5 asked: “Who is going to work in two feet of sludge? As well as health 
problems that would accumulate with workers and the sick leave that we would end up 
having to pay.” Similarly, a minority referred to broader concerns about “keeping their 
workers happy.” Thus EOs-1 reported that “we keep the place clean and neat…it makes our 
workers come to work with a better attitude…Ten to fifteen years ago the shop paid 
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minimum wages and worked people very hard. People in the industry would say ‘that’s a 
terrible place to work’. So now we have safety gloves and rubber boots. We tried to raise 
salaries, keep good workers and keep clean and our reputation turned around”. 
 
External pressure groups, such as environmental NGOs (local or national), and local 
community groups, were conspicuous by their absence or lack of influence. Most of them felt 
that they were too small to be of interest to such groups. As EWs-2 put it: “We’re a small 
outfit so they don’t mess with me.” Nor did the majority see their general standing with the 
community, at best, as having more than marginal significance. 
 
 
V. The Chemical Industry 
 
For chemical companies, the range of motivational drivers at play was much broader than in 
the case of electroplaters. Our interviewees provided a range of answers to our probes rather 
than a uniform response. Nevertheless, a number of themes emerge. Not least, there was a 
marked distinction between the drivers of small and medium sized enterprises on the one 
hand and of large companies on the other. For example, while sanctions were important for 
the former, they had little impact on the latter. At the same time, regulations and compliance 
with those regulations provided the baseline for large companies’ safety, health and 
environmental activities, even though such companies usually went beyond compliance. 
They did so for reasons that related primarily to risk management and to the perceived need 
to protect their reputation and maintain the trust of local communities in which they operate. 
 
A. Legal incentives 
Sanctions. Six out of nine chemical SMEs (less than 1000 employees) reported that their 
behavior had been affected by fines or a jail sentence (Q7). And three out of nine chemical 
SMEs (about the same proportion as electroplaters) mentioned the possibility of being put 
out of business by regulatory sanctions, whereas only one large company did so. CWS-9 
explained that “Bigger fines have more of an impact [than jail terms] because they can put a 
small company like ours out of business. If it’s a big company like [X], their legal 
department could stall the legal action for years. But that isn’t an option for a smaller firm.” 
Of the seven companies that thought that fines or jail sentences motivated behavior, six were 
SMEs. 
 
Typical explanations were as follows: “Threats of fines work. In our company we’ve seen 
penalties in action. Not with our company, but with another company where a company 
official went to jail. Deterrence is an issue for small companies, not large ones, because the 
large companies don’t see the regulators.” (CWS-10). “Knowing you could get caught 
changes behavior. We’ve never been in that position. But regulations are always at the back 
of my mind.”  The threat of sanctions was even more important to CWS-7, for obvious 
reasons: “I believe the threat of going of jail is particularly powerful for our company 
because we actually saw someone go to jail…” (CWS-9). 
 
In contrast, most large chemical companies (6/9) did not believe that fines or deterrence had 
an important effect on safety, health and environmental behavior. 
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COL-13: It’s more a reputational issue. There is public scrutiny if you are cited or fined. It 
impacts your ability to sell your products. In practice, the penalties aren’t significant. 
 
CWL-6: Fines aren’t a driving force. They’re minimal. …I’ve never seen any big ones.  It’s 
the publicity that’s the concern. Because it implies that you are not running the plant well. 
The general public infers that you are doing things you shouldn’t and they don’t want you in 
their community. 
 
Even some senior employees of large firms, however, were mindful that in the event of 
breach, they might be held personally liable; and this seemingly reinforced their own 
commitment to compliance. For example CWL-17 “I went to boot camp and they filled us in 
on all the new regulations we needed to be aware of. What they emphasised is that plant 
managers are ultimately responsible, whether they know about an infraction or not. They 
made it clear that pleading ignorance isn’t a way out.” 
 
Companies were asked what might happen if the rules remained in place, but enforcement 
stopped. Most companies believed that the industry would continue to maintain existing 
safety, health and environmental systems “because of institutional momentum. This way of 
thinking is ingrained in us now” (COS-16). However, they also felt that such continuing 
compliance would be contingent on the circumstances, and could not be taken for granted “If 
there were no fines there would be no real hammer. It would be a problem if the only reason 
to comply was to be a good neighbor and a huge amount of money would be saved. It would 
change upgrades and new processes going on line.” (CWL-6). 
 
Regulation and implicit deterrence. Small and medium sized enterprises companies tended 
to talk about rules and regulations as driving behavior in and of themselves. For COL-18, “I 
don’t read about the amount of penalties. I am more concerned about the regulations that got 
mentioned and whether we are in compliance with those regulations.” As with the 
electroplaters, there was an implicit recognition that non-compliance would sooner or later 
result in penalties, but this was not where they focused their attention. On the contrary, what 
was uppermost in the minds of chemical industry officials was identifying what regulation 
required of them and doing it. We return to this notion of  “implicit deterrence” in the 
discussion section. 
 
Many of the smaller chemical companies regarded compliance as their principal concern. 
They had what might be termed a ‘compliance mentality’. Typically, CWS-7 was proudest 
of: “learning the regulations, because I believe that most companies don’t know what 
regulations are in place, and what it is they are addressing.” 
 
Larger firms also took regulation seriously and, irrespective of what other safety, health and 
environmental initiatives they engaged in, made sure they met the regulatory requirements. 
Indeed, there were some issues where for them too, achieving compliance was the principal 
objective. However, larger firms, rather than adopting a ‘compliance mentality’, commonly 
went substantially beyond compliance, asserting that “Compliance is [only] the baseline” 
(COL-1) and that “You don’t have a business unless you have compliance.” 
CWL-6: “Regulation plays a minimal role. Typically we get inspected. They make 
recommendations. I’d guess 20% of our improvements are from recommendations-not 
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requirements. Typically we do it for good relations with the regulators. They are relatively easy 
to accommodate” (see further below).  
 
COL-8: “Did regulation play a role? Not really. We did fine when we implemented 
Responsible Care. It meant that we were ahead of the regulatory curve. It meant that when a 
new rule came in and we looked at what we had to do we were often already doing it. It made 
the challenge of complying with new rules relatively easy to meet.” 
 
Both larger companies and some SMEs tended to talk about how rules affected them 
economically and how that changed their behavior, and sometimes led them to take actions 
far beyond compliance requirements (rather than simply focusing on how to achieve 
compliance). Most of these however, related specifically to environmental protection, rather 
than occupational health and safety. 
 
Inspections. Inspectors and inspections, our respondents reported, had relatively little impact 
on the behavior of chemical companies. Only one chemical company out of 17 mentioned 
that inspections played a role in why it implemented specific safety, health and 
environmental actions, whereas more than a third of electroplating companies specifically 
mentioned inspections as playing a role. As COL-1 put it: “Regulators? They are there, but 
they don’t pressure us. We haven’t had more than 2 or 3 minor notices of violation in the last 
ten years, but nothing material. They come up about once a year, but we don’t get extra visits 
and we’re not under the gun”. Similarly, CWL-5 asserted: “there isn’t regulatory pressure on 
us” and for COL-8: “inspections are something we embrace. Ten years ago, responses to 
having an inspector at your door varied from ‘oh no, he’s here’ to ‘hi, glad to see you’. Now 
we see having an inspector come as an opportunity to build a relationship with the local 
folks. Having a strong relationship with local agencies is very important, so you can just call 
up if you identify a problem and say, this is happening, what are we going to do about it.” 
 
Certainly inspections had considerably less influence on chemical companies than upon 
electroplaters. Whether this was also the case one or two decades ago, we cannot be sure. 
Some companies implied that they would not have achieved their current level of  safety, 
health and environmental performance had they not been subject to considerable levels of 
inspectoral scrutiny in the past, often in conjunction with prodding by the trade association, 
which was galvanised into action by major incidents such as Bhopal and Love Canal. 
 
Legitimacy of regulation. All our respondents suggested that there was a high level of 
compliance with regulation in their industry. Some referred (in somewhat similar terms to 
electroplaters) to the moral legitimacy of regulation. For example, for CWL-5: “There are 
two types of people – the ‘I’ll get by and nobody will catch me type’ - that wouldn’t be 
tolerated in our company-  and the ‘right thing to do /keep in compliance’ type.” COS-3 was 
influenced by: “an overall company philosophy. Everyone understands what we are 
committed to, we’re careful about storm sewers, operation, processes, generating dust- and 
the people responsible for maintenance have to be told why we have it and we tell them what 
the regulations say and why we do it… we’re committed to doing business in ethical ways 
and that’s the reason.” CWL-5 asked: “What’s most important? Lots of us live in the area, 
just being good neighbors, everyone wants to work in a safe environment and to do the right 
thing for the environment”. 
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None criticised the need for regulation, and some recognised that it was desirable- 
“Regulation? -We brought it on ourselves ‘laws don’t fall out of the sky. There were missiles 
[Bhopal] that prompted the regulations…this is not the way to go.” COL-13: “Government 
regulations are probably the cornerstone of it and while sometimes we as an industry, and we 
as a company, don’t see the scientific support for some of the regulations and feel the money 
could have been better spent, for the most part, these regulations have been very important in 
improving environmental performance.” 
 
General Deterrence. Responses relating to issues of general deterrence were mixed. In 
describing why they had taken a particular safety, health or environmental action, not a 
single chemical company mentioned that they were motivated by an enforcement action that 
occurred against another company. However, when specifically prompted and asked about 
the importance of deterrence, most SMEs (6/9) and one (of 8) large companies, felt that 
hearing about other companies being penalised, was a motivator.12  For example CWS-10 
acknowledged that “the threats of fines work…I realise the likelihood of getting caught 
probably isn’t as high as it could be. However in our company we have seen the penalties in 
action, not within our firm but with another company, where one company official went to 
jail.” The type of penalty was also influential for some: CWS-7 suggested, “fines don’t have 
that big an impact. However, jail is different because it affects individuals. No one wants to 
go to jail. I don’t want to go to jail.” However, from their responses, it seemed that it was 
only if a firm “similar to us’ was penalised, that general deterrence  might have an impact 
upon them. 
 
In contrast, many large chemical companies reported being totally unconcerned with 
deterrence. For them, the threat of penalties did not hold any fear, because they felt they were 
comfortably in compliance. For example, COL-1 noted “Certainly upper management is 
cognisant of potential costs of fines, civil and criminal. They are quite well aware. But the 
record speaks for itself. We are not even close to that. You don’t even think about that….  
And if you do Responsible Care properly, you can’t miss raising the level of consciousness 
and doing things that maybe have not been done. That’s far more important than the threat of 
prison.” And even those (predominantly SMEs) who did feel that hearing about others being 
punished had some influence on their behavior did not place great weight on this as a 
motivating factor. As noted earlier (and again below), the regulations themselves were far 
more important, for reasons unrelated to general deterrence. 
 
B. Economic motivations 
The large majority of chemical companies responded to the economic incentives that 
regulation and liability rules themselves provided, using less (and less harmful) chemicals, 
and investing in new production equipment that was simultaneously more efficient and less 
polluting. Significantly, the large majority of these examples relate to environmental 
protection, and to waste recycling and pollution protection in particular, rather than OHS. 
The driver for these changes was commonly not a perception of ‘win-win’ opportunities in 
the abstract, but rather that regulation had substantially increased the costs of traditional 
industry practices. Responding to the incentive to cut costs, many chemical manufacturers 
had adopted a range of pollution prevention, reduction and recycling initiatives, thus finding 
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ways in which to conceive of mandated safety, health and environmental actions as 
opportunities to achieve economic efficiencies. For example, COH4 reported: “We spent 
close to $500,000 a year to collect and dispose but now its less than $50,000 dollars a year.” 
 
Because going beyond compliance often was expected to save them money, large chemical 
companies (and some SMEs) actively searched such measures, indicating a degree of 
proactivity and forward thinking that contrasted sharply with the approach of most 
electroplaters: So CWL-6 took the view that: “Anything you are discarding hurts the bottom 
line and if you [minimise waste] you’re not using as many of the bad chemicals. We’ve used 
elimination and substitution and achieved dramatic drops in the last ten years. Why? Disposal 
costs have clearly gone up, chemical costs have gone up. The general health of employees.” 
CWL-11 went further. Having developed a new process to meet tougher Californian 
standards, they discovered this made them considerably more efficient, and, in an attempt to 
leverage their R&D, exported that practice to their plants in other states even though the 
latter did not require it. Others sought to use less toxic materials in order to lower their 
insurance costs. 
 
More broadly, a theme that permeated a number of interviews, particularly with larger 
companies, was that the industry has gradually learned by doing and improved efficiencies. 
Certainly concerns about regulation, liability and insurance were important motivators of this 
improvement, but so too were prompting and prodding from the ACC’s Responsible Care 
program (below), information derived from plant managers at sister plants, and occasional 
feedback from regulators, and interaction with consultants at workshops and seminars. 
 
C. Other motivators 
Reputation and Publicity. Larger firms feared the stigma associated with non-compliance, 
and the damage that adverse publicity might have for their corporate reputation, far more 
than inspections potential legal punishment. CWL-6 summed this up as follows: “I don’t 
believe fines are a driving force. They are typically minimal. The publicity is a driving force. 
It leads the general public to believe you’re doing things you’re not supposed to do. It opens 
the door for watchdog groups, - you’ve flagged yourself.” 
 
In describing why the industry’s environmental performance had improved (q1), 8/17 
chemical companies mentioned reputation or publicity as playing an important role. Again, 
their focus was largely on environment, rather than on OHS. Of these 8 companies, 6 were 
large. In contrast, no electroplating facilities identified these factors as important. Similarly, 
reputation for compliance was not a major concern for small and medium sized chemical 
companies, which had no consumer brand name to protect and were unlikely to figure in the 
toxic release inventory.13 As CWS-5 pointed out: “ We are in an industrial area: We don’t 
affect any individual to speak of. We don’t impact on our neighbors. We are a fragrance plant 
- we tend to smell pleasant!” And for CWS-7: “Nobody knows us so there isn’t much of a 
reputation to preserve.” 
 
Yet at facility level, maintaining the trust of the local community was commonly cited as a 
high priority. For example, for COL-2 it was “the people 300 yards outside the perimeter 
fence” that were their main concern, and “the right thing to do is to operate the facility with 
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someone who has kids downstream [in mind]. We’re going to be a good corporate neighbor - 
we’re not going to cause them harm by either acts of omission, commission, or catastrophic 
events.” 
 
For reputation sensitive companies, the risk of negative publicity was a particular focus. 
First, it could affect a company’s relationship with the local community. This in turn that 
could threaten the very existence of the facility, since the community might successfully 
oppose or delay permit permissions, or otherwise block expansion plans or proposed 
technological change at facility level. One way or another, facilities whose existence was 
seen as illegitimate by the local community faced ‘being regulated to death’.14 
 
Second, negative publicity could effect a company’s relationship with its customers, 
suppliers, and regulators, and thus its bottom line although this again related more to 
environment than to OHS. COL-1 summed this up as follows: “It’s more what comes with 
the fine - the publicity - you potentially lose customers if they find that there has been a 
serious fine. Customers now more than ever want environmentally responsible suppliers - 
that’s one of the questions they ask - and those things really can hurt a company.” Why? 
“They realised they don’t need the embarrassment and the media issues. The people at the 
top won’t tolerate violations and potential litigation. It can be managed. You don’t have to 
spend on lawyers to bail you out.” 
 
In order to meet these broader societal expectations and to protect corporate reputation, larger 
enterprises often found it necessary to go ‘beyond compliance’. For example, COL- 1 
emphasised that what underpinned decision making in his company was not regulation but 
prudence: “You look at the situation, you don’t look at the law. The law’s a given.” Prudence 
implied strategic judgment in the light of stakeholder pressures. For example: “We ship our 
hazardous waste off site. We could make a case that only a portion of it is really hazardous 
but there’s some risk if it goes wrong. I haven’t looked at the cost but cost is not part of the 
calculation.” For facilities with emissions above Toxic Release Inventory theresholds, the 
fact that information about levels of chemical emissions was widely available was also a 
significant driver of beyond compliance behavior. 
 
Management Style. Management style and corporate values had a significant influence on 
the behavior of large companies in a way that was not apparent with SMEs. In describing 
why the industry’s safety, health and environmental performance had improved (Q1), 7/17 
chemical companies mentioned management commitment, attitude, or management systems 
as playing a role. Only one electroplating company made any such mention. In addition, 
almost half the large chemical facilities (8/8) mentioned the role of internal management 
attitudes (for example, considerations of internal corporate philosophy) in their decision to 
take particular safety, health and environmental actions (Q2-4), whereas one of nine smaller 
chemical companies did so. Those with international ownership were particularly striking in 
this regard. For example COL-16 told us that “a lot is due to the German [owners], as they 
have a great safety record and don’t mess around with human safety…Top management 
wants it that way.” However, a somewhat similar proportion (4/10) of larger (between 30 and 
120 employees) electroplating companies also thought management was an important factor 
in their decisions to implement particular environmental actions. Thus, overall, management 
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style appears to play a more important role in the chemical industry than it does in the 
electroplating industry, and in both industries, management style appears to play a more 
important role in larger companies. 
 
Trade Association. Approximately one third of the chemical companies told us that 
participation in the American Chemical Council’s Responsible Care program structured 
many of their safety, health and environmental initiatives. Seven of seventeen chemical 
companies we spoke to attributed the industry’s safety, health and environmental 
improvement in part to this trade association driven initiative: for example, according to 
COL-8: “The Responsible Care program that CMA put together dovetailed well with what 
we felt we needed to do…It allows you to apply the things you are supposed to do. It’s an 
umbrella. It makes your philosophy tangible by establishing norms, procedures and channels 
to reach goals.” 
COL-1: The American Chemical Council has had a tremendous effect - not so much 
enlightening large firms - they were in line anyway and have the systems in place - but they got 
the smaller guys’ levels of consciousness raised…. 
 
On the other hand, for the most part, only larger companies in our sample were members of 
Responsible Care. And separating the rhetoric from the reality was difficult. A number of 
companies began the interview by citing the virtues and influence of Responsible Care, but 
when asked about what drove specific safety, health and environmental initiatives, 
Responsible Care was rarely mentioned. 
 
Supply chain pressure. Small and medium sized enterprises, but not large ones, spoke of 
pressures they experienced from their larger trading partners to improve their environmental 
(as distinct from OHS) performance. For example: 
COS-4: Reputation is a significant concern. Our clients are the government and 
Boeing. Image is very important. We sell our products as environmentally friendly. 
 
COS-14: Our clients are corporate water plants and their public image is very 
important to them. 
 
The other side of this coin, a number of the large companies in our sample spoke of 
monitoring the environmental practices of their smaller trading partners. Typically, COL-16 
asserted that they “will not conduct business with companies who have questionable 
practices. We audit all our vendors who supply us with chemicals and verify to make sure 
they don’t do anything questionable. Moreover, we audit our customers to make sure that the 
chemicals we produce don’t end up in the wrong hands.” 
 
Trade Unions: The electroplaters in our sample were so small that it was highly unlikely that 
their workers would belong to a trade union. In contrast, in the large chemical companies at 
least, a union presence could be anticipated. Yet in response to open ended questions, none of 
the management respondents identified the impact of trade unions as being an influence on 
their behavior. This may be in part, because their response to many questions focused on 
environment rather than OHS, In consequence, we are unable to throw any light on the 
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influence of trade unions on OHS in the context of a study of American firms in the 
chemicals and electroplating industries. 
 
 
VI. Discussion 
 
In the light of our findings, we return to the basic research questions raised at the beginning 
of this paper. In stimulating compliance by regulated businesses, how salient are the “explicit 
general deterrence” messages sent by formal legal sanctions against other firms,  compared to 
(a) the “specific deterrence” engendered by inspections of and legal sanctions against the 
firm itself; and (b) the “implicit deterrence” message sent simply by the dissemination of 
governmental regulations? Compared to legal deterrence, how salient are other factors – such 
as the threat of informal economic and social sanctions, or normative commitments to 
compliance with laws and regulations - as stimuli for compliance efforts? And do 
motivations vary  -- depending for example, on the type and size of organisation (Gray & 
Scholz 1991), or the characteristics of particular industry sectors? 
 
Specific deterrence.  Specific deterrence in its narrowest sense – previous sanction against a 
company inclining it to make more strenuous efforts to avoid future penalties – had a 
significant impact on a substantial minority of companies in our sample. Twenty-four per 
cent (4/17) of electroplaters and 11% (1/9) of chemical SMEs said that a legal penalty against 
their company in the past had influenced its subsequent safety, health and environmental 
actions. But the large chemical companies in our sample, who reported having had only 
minor violations over the last decade, had experienced no significant enforcement. For them, 
therefore, specific deterrence was not a salient driver of safety, health and environmental 
actions (Q2-4). 
 
Specific deterrence in its broader sense also includes the impact of inspections (with their 
implicit threat of sanctions). For electroplaters, inspections played an important role, 
prompting them to undertake whatever action was required of them in the belief that further 
enforcement action, with potentially profound consequences, would have followed from 
continuing non-compliance.15 Inspections also had an important “reminder function” for 
firms inclined to comply because it was the ‘right thing to do.’ Again, however, chemical 
companies said that inspections did not have a significant influence on them; only one 
identified inspection as an important reason for taking particular environmental actions. Most 
stated that they were already substantially beyond compliance, and so inspections held no 
fear for them. 
 
Explicit General Deterrence. Knowledge about legal sanctions against other companies, 
according to our interviews, played only a very modest role in the case of electroplaters and 
an even smaller one for chemical companies. In the case of the former, only 12% (2/17) said 
a fine or prison sentence at another company had influenced specific safety, health and 
environmental actions (Q2-4). Only 1/17 saw general deterrence as a powerful motivator for 
specific actions; 11/17 saw it as a relatively unimportant motivator. Among chemical SMEs, 
no one identified a safety, health or environmental action that occurred against another 
company as having influenced particular actions in their facilities. However, when 
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prompted, many felt that hearing about another firm being penalised might influence them if 
the circumstances were sufficiently similar. Large chemical companies reported that they 
were not at all influenced by such considerations. 
 
There seem to be three reasons why the impact of explicit general deterrence was small. 
First, companies had great difficulty comparing their own circumstances with those of the 
company that had been penalised, and most commonly dismissed the latter as being 
irrelevant (see also Braithwaite & Makkai (1991)). Second, the very large majority of our 
respondents were in compliance and an increasing number are going beyond compliance. In 
these circumstances, hearing about punishments imposed on recalcitrants did not resonate 
with their own circumstances and held little fear for them. Third, the type of penalty imposed 
was important; some respondents suggested that it was only hearing about someone in 
similar circumstances going to prison, rather than merely being fined that would influence 
them. 
 
However, explicit general deterrence did play a significant reminder function for both 
electroplaters and chemical companies - prompting them to review their own operations and 
think about safety, health and environmental risks that otherwise might not have gained their 
immediate attention. Nevertheless, few reported making any significant changes as a result of 
such a reassessment. 
 
Explicit general deterrence also fulfilled a reassurance function.  Many respondents 
conceded that without effective enforcement, the overall performance of the industry would 
decline over time, as compliant firms would lose confidence that there was a ‘level playing 
field’ in terms of safety, health and environmental standards. Many respondents placed 
considerable emphasis on this function, as complaints about enforcement commonly focused 
on the injustice of others not being punished, or not being punished heavily enough. 
 
Implicit General Deterrence. What we have called “implicit general deterrence” – the threat 
of legal sanctions implied by the mere promulgation or history of enforcement of laws and 
regulations in the contemporary United States – was much more salient for our respondents 
than either specific deterrence or explicit general deterrence.  Although many of our 
respondents acted for instrumental reasons, they did not seem to engage in any careful 
weighing of the benefits of non-compliance versus the probability of being discovered and 
punished, as predicted by traditional deterrence theory. On the contrary, almost all our 
respondents gave the impression that there was no point even debating whether to comply or 
not. Compliance was regarded as mandatory. Legal punishment of serious violations were 
seen as virtually inevitable by electroplators and chemical SMEs. Electroplaters voiced this 
sense of most strongly, which may reflect enforcement actions these facilities had 
experienced in the past: 8/17 electroplating companies mentioned previous violations, fines, 
jail sentences, or threats of facility closure. Every electroplating facility was regularly 
inspected at least once a year: by the local sewer district if they had a discharge to the sewer, 
by the fire department, and by state and federal environmental agencies. However, even 
smaller chemical companies (another industry subjected to substantial regulatory scrutiny 
and penalties in the past) commonly voiced a similar view. 
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This sense of regulatory inevitability was reinforced by the widespread perception among 
respondents that it was firms “like theirs who were most vulnerable to inspection and 
enforcement. Thus large firms believed that small firms were ‘getting away with it’ while 
they themselves were not,16 while the converse was the perception of small enterprises”.17 
 
Our interviews indicate that “implicit general deterrence” arises from the general history of a 
particular regulatory regime (in this case targeted enforcement over the previous decade). In 
these industries inspection and enforcement activity have generated a ‘culture of 
compliance’, such that it becomes almost unthinkable to regulatees that they would 
calculatedly (as opposed to inadvertently) break the law. Most18 of our respondents took a 
similar view to EWs-7: “It’s ludicrous to let things go and imagine you won’t get into 
trouble…We are subject to inspection and to fines, huge fines, for not doing it. You can’t 
fight that. You either comply or get out of the business.” Thus it was the regulations 
themselves (rather than hearing about enforcement actions against other firms) that had the 
most direct impact on behavior. Rather than simply providing a threat, the regulations (as 
well as inspections) act as a reminder to enterprises as to what is required of them. But that 
occurs against a backdrop where the common perception was that ‘you go out of business if 
you don’t comply.’ 
 
Indeed, for many interviewees, the regulations had become so embedded in their culture that 
they exerted an almost unconscious influence on decision-making. Some respondents 
attributed legally required safety, health and environmental steps at their facilities not to 
regulation but to the firms’ safety, health and environmental ethos, seemingly oblivious to 
the extent to which they operated in a thick regulatory soup which constrained many of their 
choices.19 
 
For large chemical manufacturers, however, the mechanisms that led to compliance were 
rather different. Such firms commonly described regulation as only ‘the baseline,’ implying 
that it was a taken-for-granted minimum standard which they would usually substantially 
exceed for a variety of reasons discussed below. For them, regulation was taken for granted 
not because of the perceived inevitability of sanctions (that is, implicit general deterrence) 
but because they felt a failure to comply would send very undesirable signals to important 
stakeholders, triggering a variety of informal sanctions. Yet the law was seen as a moral 
barometer of acceptable behavior in the minds of their investors, employees, customers, and 
local governments, and hence they had to attend closely to legal compliance. Whether 
regulation would have a much greater role for large companies facing economic hard times, 
who are cash-strapped and short-term in their approach, we are unable to say.  
 
Normative factors. Strikingly absent from our interviews were diatribes against regulation in 
general or the unreasonableness of particular regulatory demands. On the contrary, almost 
half the electroplaters and chemical companies in our sample professed to comply not for 
instrumental reasons (including deterrence) but rather because it was the ‘right thing to do’. 
This civic responsibility explanation of compliance was an important theme that permeated 
many of our interviews. A substantial number of electroplaters, for example, indicated that, 
now being aware of the safety, health and environmental consequences of their actions, a 
return to the egregious behavior of earlier decades was almost unthinkable, even in the 
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absence of regulation and its enforcement. 
 
Interviewees tended to divide the world into two types of people, ‘good guys’ (like them) 
who obey the law voluntarily, and ‘bad guys' who don’t. Two things followed from this. 
First, regulation served a reminder function as to what it meant to be a good guy: a 
predisposition to ‘do the right thing’ was tightened or brought into focus by the introduction 
of specific regulation. Thus regulation had an important normative as well as economic 
function – you can’t be a good guy and remain calculatedly non-compliant. For good guys, 
inspections often served a reminder function, reinforcing, through instruction and education, 
what could reasonably be expected of them. Second, regulation served a reassurance 
function. Since they believed bad guys would cheat if possible and thereby gain an unfair 
business advantage, our respondents indicated that they would be far less inclined to 
voluntary compliance if others were perceived to be “getting away with it.” The sanctions 
imposed on others provided a reassuring backdrop to their own decision-making. Thus 
voluntary compliance is likely to be greater where enterprises believe not only that the rules 
are fair but also that they are fairly applied (Burby & Paterson 1993). 
 
This ‘level playing field’ argument was less common amongst chemical companies. Many of 
the larger companies identified senior management commitment as a major reason for 
improved safety, health and environmental performance without any intimation that this 
might be contingent on what others were doing. The Responsible Care program was regarded 
by many as the vehicle which had sensitised not only large, but more recently, smaller 
companies to their safety, health and environmental obligations, while also providing a 
vehicle through which they might strive for continuous improvement. In neither case did 
respondents express reservations based on the performance of other companies. This is 
perhaps understandable given the importance which they placed on protecting their “social 
license,” (Guuingham et al. 2003) which they needed to do irrespective of how others 
behaved. 
 
Overall, the evidence on normative considerations casts doubt on the assumptions of explicit 
deterrence theory, at least for those who perceive themselves as ‘good guys’. This group did 
not behave as amoral rational actors; instrumental considerations (weighing up the chances of 
detection and likely penalties) were not the primary motivator. Deterrence was important at 
least for electroplaters and smaller chemical companies, but primarily by reassuring them 
that ‘bad guys’ would be caught. For those who might be tempted to become bad guys, 
deterrence, particularly implicit general deterrence, played a much more important role. 
 
Social pressures.  For small electroplaters and small chemical companies, informal pressure, 
such as that which might be brought to bear by local communities or local community 
groups, or by local or national environmental groups, had very little or no impact on their 
behavior. Smaller businesses perceived themselves (accurately it would seem) as being 
‘beneath the radar” of community or environmental activists (or presumably trade unions), 
and as facing no significant threat from such groups. Only a minority expressed any concern 
about adverse publicity. 
 
In marked contrast, for larger chemical corporations social pressures, concerns about 
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protecting their reputation and avoiding bad publicity were the primary drivers of 
environmental performance (far less for OHS). Regulation was important, but mainly 
because of the stigma associated with being sanctioned. Violations of their ‘social license’, 
they believed, could damage their relationship with local communities, and even the public at 
large, and in so doing could result in serious economic damage. For example, it might 
undermine their ability to obtain necessary approvals for plant expansion or technological 
change. Such violations could also threaten their relationships with regulators and other 
important stakeholders. 
 
The reasons for this marked difference in approach between the two industry sectors likely 
lie not only in differences in size (large chemical companies are vastly larger than ‘large’ 
electroplaters), sophistication and visibility, but also in the profiles of the two industries. The 
chemical industry has experienced a number of dramatic, highly visible and serious safety, 
health or environmental accidents – Bhopal being the defining event. Such incidents were 
mentioned in a number of interviews, and, although they took place many years ago, have 
clearly left their mark, both on individual companies and on the industry association. 
Essentially, the chemical industry, like the tobacco industry, has direct intimations of what it 
means to lose (or almost lose) its social license. Thus, like nuclear power companies in the 
wake of the Three Mile Island incident, chemical companies feel themselves, in Joseph 
Rees’s (1994) apt phrase “hostages of each other.” 
  
Economic pressures. Amongst electroplaters, 40% of larger facilities attributed 
improvements in industry safety, health or environmental performance, in part, to economic 
incentives. And 80% of all electroplaters attributed some particular environmental responses 
actions, in part, to economic drivers. However, small electroplaters, when asked in broader 
terms about influences on their behavior, almost invariably identified regulation, not 
financial savings, as the principal driver of improvements. In the case of chemical 
companies, economic incentives were substantially more important, with 53% (9/17) 
identifying this as an important motivator for  safety, health or environmental improvement 
in the industry. 
 
For the most part, however, although companies tended to speak of safety, health or 
environmental investments made to save costs, on closer scrutiny most changes they 
described were driven by the costs imposed by regulation or liability rules. Large chemical 
companies were distinctive in the extent to which they devoted energy to anticipating and 
finding ways to minimise such costs. Thus their approach was not merely to comply, but to 
comply in the least cost way, and ideally to save money by planning or other means. The 
focus of such companies on risk management also led them to actively seek out mechanisms 
to reduce risks, often in ways that took them substantially beyond compliance. In contrast, 
few electroplaters perceived the possibility of ‘win-win’ opportunities likely to result in both 
safety, health and environmental improvement and economic benefit. As a result they did not 
seek out such opportunities and remained almost entirely reactive, benefiting sometimes from 
initiatives required of them by regulation, but rarely taking the initiative.20 And overall, 
environmental performance was seen as costly, not profitable. Hence external pressures, 
particularly regulation, and to a lesser extent, the normative concern to ‘do the right thing’ 
were the dominant drivers of safety, health and environmental improvements. 
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Supply chain pressure was also important, at least for those small electroplaters who dealt 
with large customers whose own environmental (as distinct from OHS) credentials were 
important to their business success. The latter commonly insisted that their smaller and 
weaker trading partners comply with specified environmental criteria as a condition of the 
contract of supply. Small electroplaters had little alternative but to conform to such 
conditions. Outside of these circumstances however, electroplaters sold on price and quality 
alone, and their customers had no impact on their environmental behavior. In contrast, small 
and medium sized chemical companies experienced similar pressures almost across the 
board, because their larger trading partners (primarily large chemical companies) were 
themselves vulnerable to environmental pressures (as distinct from OHS pressures) and 
insisted on environmental credentials in their smaller trading partners as a matter or risk 
management. 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
In the United States, deterrence lies at the very heart of regulatory policy and its 
enforcement. Yet amongst electroplaters and chemicals companies, neither of the two 
conventional forms of deterrence played a major role in shaping corporate safety, health and 
environmental behavior. Certainly specific deterrence in its narrow form (as punishment) had 
a significant influence on the future compliance of those who were subject to it, but less than 
a third of respondents mentioned such influences. And general deterrence was reported to 
have had only a very weak influence on the behavior of electroplaters, and an even weaker 
one on chemical companies. However, general deterrence did serve as a reminder to firms 
about issues that might otherwise not have gained their attention (even though it rarely 
influenced their actions) and as a reassurance that others were not ‘getting away with it’ 
while they spent money and energy on costly compliance measures. 
 
Of far greater importance than either specific or general deterrence was what we term 
‘implicit general deterrence’, a category not recognised in the policy literature. We were 
struck by how many of our smaller respondents failed to engage in detailed calculations as to 
the likelihood of detection or the severity of punishment of the type predicted by deterrence 
theorists.21 Instead they appeared to use general rules of thumb: you will get caught, the 
penalty could put you out of business, resistance is futile. We concluded that the overall 
effect of sustained inspection and enforcement activity has been to inculcate a ‘culture of 
compliance.’ Thus it was the regulations themselves rather than enforcement action that 
currently had a direct impact on behavior. Rather than simply providing a threat, regulations 
and inspections acted as a reminder to enterprises as to what was required of them. 
 
Yet instrumental considerations, even in the more complex form of implicit general 
deterrence, were not the only ones that weighed upon our respondents. Almost half, our 
respondents also provided a range of normative explanations for why they complied. In 
essence, many of them perceived themselves as ‘good guys’, complying with safety, health 
and environmental regulation because it was the right thing to do. However, they struggled to 
disentangle normative from instrumental motiv
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backslide when safety, health and environmental improvements proved expensive. In the 
absence of regulation and implicit general deterrence, it is questionable whether their good 
intentions would have translated into practice. 
  
In any event, deterrence in any form was of far greater concern to SMEs than it was to large 
ones. For major reputation-sensitive firms in the safety, health and environmentally sensitive 
chemical industry, regulation and its enforcement played only a minor role (‘as a baseline’) 
and most chose to go substantially beyond compliance for reasons that related to risk 
management considerations and to the perceived need to protect their social license to 
operate. Crucial in this regard was maintaining the trust and support of local communities, of 
avoiding the attention of environmental groups and other potentially critical stakeholders, 
and of preserving the company’s reputation as an environmentally responsible entity. Thus 
when it came to social license, environmental considerations were far more prominent than 
OHS. 
 
Large companies could also be distinguished from the smaller companies in terms of how 
they went about complying or over-complying. They treated regulation and liability rules as 
sources of substantial additional costs, and hence as economic signals – to which they 
responded by seeking out and often finding solutions that substantially mitigated those costs 
and occasionally even saved them money overall. In this regard, they were proactive and 
innovative in a way that boundedly-rational small companies, particularly electroplaters, 
most certainly were not. 
 
Thus there are various strands that must be taken into account in understanding what 
motivates corporate environmental behavior. Importantly, many, but not all of these strands 
are interwoven. There is a tight coupling for example, between normative and instrumental 
explanations for compliance. Even those who see themselves as ‘good guys’ and who comply 
because it is ‘the right thing to do,’ suggest they would be reticent to do so if they are not 
confident that the ‘bad guys’ are being effectively regulated and sanctioned. Similarly, there 
is a connection between informal social pressures and formal legal ones. Thus the law is seen 
by many (including local communities) as a moral barometer, and any company found in 
non-compliance risks not only legal sanctions but the informal stigma and reputation damage 
that the community and other stakeholders may inflict. 
 
Finally, how these various strands play out depends very much on the size and sophistication 
of companies themselves and on the characteristics of the industry sector within which they 
are located. Electroplaters responded very differently to various external drivers than did 
chemical companies, and even within the latter, small and medium sized companies were 
influenced by substantially different considerations from large companies. Overall, there was 
little support for models of business firms as “amoral calculators,” who carefully weigh the 
certainty and severity of sanctions and who can be manipulated through a judicious mix of 
specific and general deterrence. 
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NOTES 
 
1. The adversarial, legalistic style of American regulatory agencies can be contrasted 
with the more conciliatory, compliance oriented approach taken almost all other 
Anglo-Saxon countries. See for example Kagan (2002). 
2. See for example, Becker (1968), Stigler (1970) and Miller & Anderson (1986). There 
is empirical as well as theoretical support for this deterrence-based theory of 
compliance. According to Regens et al. (1997), "We also find that pollution control 
investment is positively related to the EPA enforcement budget, suggesting at the 
very least the industries believe that the EPA will increase its investigatory efforts as 
their budget increases." 
3. Kagan, R. et al. In Hawkins and Thomas (1984).  In terms of the management 
literature, the rational actor model is closely associated with the strategic planning 
school approach. The latter too, assumes that managers act according to a fairly 
narrow economic calculus, that they are able to obtain near perfect information both 
about their own organisation and about the wider economic and business 
environment, and that they have very considerable discretion in how they implement 
their preferred strategy within the organisation. Whittington (1993). 
4. For example, the perceived risk of detection is more important than the perceived 
likelihood and severity of sanctions. Perceived informal sanctions seem to have a 
much stronger effect than formal sanctions. See Burby and Paterson (1993):753-772; 
Gray and Scholz (1991):185-214. Braithwaite and Makkai (1991):7-40 found very 
little deterrent impact of inspections or sanctions in the case of nursing home 
regulation, and Winter and May (2001):675-98, found that normative and social 
motivations were as important in affecting compliance as are motivations based on 
expected utility and deterrence. For an excellent review of the economics literature 
see Cohen (1998). 
5. A literature review is contained in our companion paper. See Thornton et al. (2005). 
For a general review see OECD (2000). 
6. With regard to the Ohio Electroplaters, 22 were contacted with 9 refusing, 8 
accepting to participate and 5 where the researchers never connected despite 
numerous attempts with the environmental manager. For the Washington 
electroplaters, 25 companies were contacted, with 5 of them failing to meet our 
criteria, 10 of them refusing to participate, 8 of them completing the interview, and 
two proving too difficult to connect with the environmental manager. For the 
Washington chemical companies, 28 companies were contacted, with 7 of them 
failing to meet our criteria, 6 refusing, 8 participating, and 7 others where it proved 
too difficult to connect with the environmental manager. For the Ohio chemical 
companies, 26 companies were contacted in all, with 8 of those failing to meet our 
criteria, 8 completing the interview, and 10 refusing to participate. The facilities were 
chosen in order to ensure that the sample included respondents from urban areas 
(Seattle and Spokane in WA, Cleveland and Cincinnati in OH as well as rural areas; 
companies that operated a number of facilities in a number of states as well as those 
that operated only a single facility; and companies that ranged significantly in size 
from mom-and-pop operations to multinationals. Response rates were 36% (8/22) for 
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WA electroplaters, 45% (9/20) and for OH electroplaters. The most common reason 
given for non-response was lack of time to participate in a 1-hour interview. 
Response rates were 38% (8/21) for WA chemical companies and 56% for OH 
chemical companies (10/18). 
The non-respondents do not appear to have been disproportionately “bad apples”; nor 
were the respondents disproportionately “good apples.”  Using the EPA’s “ECHO” 
on-line data set (http://www.epa.gov/echo/compliance_report.html) , we found that in 
2002-03, the average “quarters in noncompliance” (according to government 
inspectors) for electroplaters in our Washington sample was 1.38; for Washington 
electroplaters who declined to participate, the figure was 1.25, slightly less. We also 
compared electroplaters in our Ohio sample with all Ohio electroplaters in the EPA 
database, and the average quarters in noncompliance for both groups was virtually 
equal. Respondents in Washington more often were larger firms than were non 
respondents (which nevertheless were slightly larger, on average, than the industry 
norm). But in Ohio respondents were about the same size, on average, as the industry 
norm, according to the EPA data set.  
7. In this regard, Thornton et al. (2005), revealed that electroplaters were likely to assess 
the probability that fines might lead to facility closure, as far higher than those of 
other sectors and that they had a much higher risk perception that an owner/operator 
would be incarcerated for a serious offence. 
8. For a description of a 1999 EPA-supported benchmarking report that surveyed the 
range of environmental performance for the electroplating industry see Benchmarking 
Environmental Performance in the Strategic Goals Program 
http://www.sectorstar.org/sector/MetalFinishing/index.cfm. 
9. The substantial improvement in the environmental performance of chemicals industry 
is also supported by hard data. See annual Toxic Release Inventory data relating to 
the chemical industry reported annually on the American Chemicals Council website 
www.americanchemistry.com  
10. See Startrek, The Next Generation www.startrek.com/startrek/view/series/TNG/ 
11. Of course, water, sewer and waste disposal charges may have increased not due to 
market forces alone, but due to regulations affecting water suppliers, sewer treatment 
plants, and waste disposal facilities. 
12. Particular environmental actions refer to respondents’ answers to Q2-4 which asked 
which environmental actions they were proudest of, which were most important, and 
concerning crucial day-to-day actions and did not prompt respondents to consider the 
role of deterrence. Prompted questions regarding deterrence refer to respondent’s 
answers to Q7-9 in which they were specifically asked to address issues of deterrence. 
13. The levels of chemicals released by SMEs are likely to fall below threshold levels 
required for TRI reporting. 
14. For a similar account of such “social license” pressures in the pulp manufacturing 
industry see Gunningham et al. (2003). 
15. The finding that inspections alone (without some significant form of enforcement 
activity) influenced compliance levels seems contrary to the findings (based on 
detailed statistical analysis with large samples) by Gray and Scholz (1991). However 
our finding must be interpreted in the broader context of a high level of enforcement 
in the electroplating industry in the past, which had given rise to a pervasive belief in 
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the inevitability of enforcement action in the longer term and the assumption that 
‘you either comply or they shut you down’. 
16. For example, according to EOl-4 “they are not hitting the small companies - we dug 
up on the internet where our competitors stand - we see from the EPA site, they are 
targeting larger companies. Small companies are under the radar - larger companies 
have a higher profile and more visits and chances of getting caught.” 
17. For Ews-6 “the fines are pretty significant but the big guys feel no one can mess with 
them - the regulators wouldn’t monkey with the aircraft industry.” 
18. Indeed, 60% of electroplaters felt the only choices were comply or shut down. 
19. For example, COS-3, attributed her firm’s improved environmental performance to an 
ethical commitment and to the influence of the American Chemical Council’s 
Responsible Care voluntary initiative. However, her firm’s most important 
environmental actions seemed to be shaped by neither of these considerations but 
rather, albeit subtly and indirectly, by regulation. Thus waste reduction and recycling, 
avoiding groundwater contamination, and containment of storage tanks were 
identified as the firm’s most important environmental priorities. But in each case, 
although our respondent did not point to this, their actions had been influenced by 
regulation. Waste, she acknowledged, ‘had to be reported to EPA’ and their waste 
reduction initiatives coincided with changes in EPA rulemaking. Moreover, the 
consequences of groundwater contamination were expensive precisely because 
regulation make them so, and notwithstanding that she asserted that ‘the regulations 
had no relevance’ to their storage tanks initiative, that initiative also coincided with 
the requirement under the UST regulations, to complete a major upgrade over a ten 
year period. Similarly, “In my three years I haven’t seen an authority figure,” asserted 
E1 when asked about the impact of regulation. But he then went on to mention that 
“the city guy [the sewer authority] comes around once a month but not others. He 
keeps track and does a one-year write up and looks at everything. And the fire 
department comes once a year, but that’s it. 
20. Supply chain pressure was also important, at least for those small electroplaters who 
dealt with large customers whose own environmental credentials were important to 
their business success. The latter commonly insisted that their smaller and weaker 
trading partners comply with specified environmental criteria as a condition of the 
contract of supply. Small electroplaters had little alternative but to conform to such 
conditions. Outside of these circumstances however, electroplaters sold on price and 
quality alone, and their customers had no impact on their environmental behavior. In 
contrast, small and medium sized chemical companies experienced similar pressures 
almost across the board, because their larger trading partners (primarily large 
chemical companies) were themselves vulnerable to environmental pressures and 
insisted on environmental credentials in their smaller trading partners as a matter or 
risk management. 
21. The objective deterrence literature assumes that the actual threat of punishment 
certainty associated with committing a crime and the degree of severity will affect 
some objective measurement of crime. See Paternoster and Zimring (1978) In 
Blumstein et al. (eds) (1978). 
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